ted the detachment at Front Royal. At Cross Keys and
Port Republic neither Fremont nor Shields expected that their flying
foe would suddenly turn at bay. Pope was unable to support Banks at
Cedar Run till the battle had been decided. When McClellan on the
Chickahominy was informed that the Valley army had joined Lee it was
too late to alter his dispositions, and no surprise was ever more
complete than Chancellorsville.
And the mystery that always involved Jackson's movements was
undoubtedly the result of calculation, He knew the effect his sudden
appearances and disappearances would have on the morale of the
Federal generals, and he relied as much on upsetting the mental
equilibrium of his opponents as on concentrating against them
superior numbers. Nor was his view confined to the field of battle
and his immediate adversary. It embraced the whole theatre of war.
The motive power which ruled the enemy's politics as well as his
armies was always his real objective. From the very first he
recognised the weakness of the Federal position--the anxiety with
which the President and the people regarded Washington--and on this
anxiety he traded. Every blow struck in the Valley campaign, from
Kernstown to Cross Keys, was struck at Lincoln and his Cabinet; every
movement, including the advance against Pope on Cedar Run, was
calculated with reference to the effect it would produce in the
Federal councils; and if he consistently advocated invasion, it was
not because Virginia would be relieved of the enemy's presence, but
because treaties of peace are only signed within sight of the hostile
capital.
It has been urged that the generals whom Jackson defeated were men of
inferior stamp, and that his capacity for command was consequently
never fairly tested. Had Grant or Sheridan, it is said, been pitted
against him in the Valley, or Sherman or Thomas on the Rappahannock,
his laurels would never have been won. The contention is fair.
Generals of such calibre as Banks and Fremont, Shields and Pope,
committed blunders which the more skilful leaders would undoubtedly
have avoided; and again, had he been pitted against a worthy
antagonist, Jackson would probably have acted with less audacity and
greater caution. It is difficult to conceive, however, that the fact
would either have disturbed his brain or weakened his resolution. Few
generals, apparently, have been caught in worse predicaments than he
was; first, when his army was near H
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