suffered him to escape from Harper's
Ferry; Sherman would probably have crushed him at the Second
Manassas; Thomas would not have been surprised at Chancellorsville.
But Jackson only pushed daring to its limits when it was safe to do
so. He knew the men he had to deal with. And in whatever situation he
might find himself he invariably reserved more than one means of
escape.

On the field of battle his manoeuvres were always sound and often
brilliant. He never failed to detect the key-point of a position, or
to make the best use of the ground. On the defensive his flanks were
always strong and his troops concealed both from view and fire; on
the offensive he invariably attacked where he was least expected. He
handled the three arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the
closest combination and with the maximum of effect. Except at
Kernstown, where Garnett interfered, his reserve was invariably put
in at exactly the right moment, and he so manipulated his command
that he was always strongest at the decisive point. Nor did he forget
that a battle is only half won where there is no pursuit, and
whenever he held command upon the field, his troops, especially the
cavalry, were so disposed that from the very outset the enemy's
retreat was menaced. The soldiers, sharers in his achievements,
compared his tactical leading with that of others, and gave the palm
to Jackson. An officer of his staff, who served continuously with the
Army of Northern Virginia, says: "I was engaged in no great battle
subsequent to Jackson's death in which I did not see the opportunity
which, in my opinion, he would have seized, and have routed our
opponents; "* (* Major Hotchkiss, C.S.A.) and General Lane writes
that on many a hard-fought field, subsequent to Chancellorsville, he
heard his veterans exclaim: "Oh for another Jackson!"

Until Jackson fell the Army of Northern Virginia, except when his
advice was overruled, had never missed an opening. Afterwards it
missed many. Gettysburg, which should have been decisive of the war,
was pre-eminently a battle of lost opportunities, and there are
others which fall into the same category. It is a perfectly fair
assumption, then, that Jackson, so unerring was his insight, would
not only have proved an efficient substitute for Lee, but that he
would have won such fame as would have placed him, as it placed his
great commander, among the most illustrious soldiers of all ages.
With any of his contemporari