ositions for
defence differed in no degree from those of the great Duke. His visit
to Waterloo, perhaps, taught the American soldier the value and
importance of concealing his troops on the defensive. It was not,
however, from Wellington that he learned to keep his plans to himself
and to use every effort to mislead his adversary. Yet no general, not
even Napoleon himself, brought about so many startling surprises as
Wellington. The passage of the Douro, the storm of the frontier
fortresses, the flank attack at Vittoria, the passage of the Adour,
the passage of the Bidassoa--were each and all of them utterly
unexpected by the French marshals; and those were by no means the
only, or the most conspicuous, instances. Was ever general more
surprised than Massena, when pursuing his retreating foe through
Portugal, in full anticipation of "driving the leopards into the
sea," he suddenly saw before him the frowning lines of Torres Vedras,
the great fortress which had sprung from earth, as it were, at the
touch of a magician's wand?
The dispatches and correspondence of the generals who were opposed to
Wellington are the clearest evidence of his extraordinary skill.
Despite their long experience, their system of spies, their excellent
cavalry, superior, during the first years of the Peninsular War, both
in numbers and training, to the English, it was seldom indeed that
the French had more than the vaguest knowledge of his movements, his
intentions, or his strength. On no other theatre of war--and they
were familiar with many--had they encountered so mysterious an enemy.
And what was the result? Constantly surprised themselves, they at
length hesitated to attack even isolated detachments. At Guinaldo, in
1812, Marmont, with 30,000 soldiers, refused to assault a ridge
occupied by no more than 13,000. The morning of Quatre-Bras, when
that important position was but thinly held, even Ney was reluctant
to engage. In the judgment of himself and his subordinates, who had
met Wellington before, the fact that there were but few red jackets
to be seen was no proof whatever that the whole allied army was not
close at hand, and the opportunity was suffered to escape. Other
generals have been content with surprising the enemy when they
advanced against him; Wellington and Jackson sought to do so even
when they were confined to the defensive.
And in still another respect may a likeness be found. Jackson's
regard for truth was not more sc
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