rmy, under the most untoward circumstances,
with the same success; whether he could have assuaged the jealousies
of the different States, and have dealt so tactfully with both
officers and men that there should have been no friction between
Virginians and Georgians, Texans and Carolinians.
It is probable that Jackson's temper was more akin to Grant's than
Lee's. Grant had the same whole-hearted regard for the cause; the
same disregard for the individual. He was just as ready as Jackson to
place a recalcitrant subordinate, no matter how high his rank, under
instant arrest, and towards the incompetent and unsuccessful he was
just as pitiless. Jackson, however, had the finer intellect. The
Federal Commander-in-Chief was unquestionably a great soldier,
greater than those who overlook his difficulties in the '64 campaign
are disposed to admit. As a strategist he ranks high. But Grant was
no master of stratagem. There was no mystery about his operations.
His manoeuvres were strong and straightforward, but he had no skill
in deceiving his adversary, and his tactics were not always of a high
order. It may be questioned whether on the field of battle his
ability was equal to that of Sherman, or of Sherman's great
antagonist, Johnston. Elsewhere he was their superior. Both Sherman
and Johnston were methodical rather than brilliant; patient,
confident, and far-seeing as they were, strictly observant of the
established principles of war, they were without a
touch of that aggressive genius which distinguished Lee, Grant, and
Jackson.
Nevertheless, to put Jackson above Grant is to place him high on the
list of illustrious captains. Yet the claim is not extravagant. If
his military characteristics are compared with those of so great a
soldier as Wellington, it will be seen that in many respects they run
on parallel lines. Both had perfect confidence in their own capacity.
"I can do," said Jackson, "whatever I will to do; "while the Duke,
when a young general in India, congratulated himself that he had
learned not to be deterred by apparent impossibilities. Both were
patient, fighting on their own terms, or fighting not at all. Both
were prudent, and yet, when audacity was justified by the character
of their opponent and the condition of his troops, they took no
counsel of their fears. They were not enamoured of the defensive, for
they knew the value of the initiative, and that offensive strategy is
the strategy which annihila
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