Lee and Johnston, notwithstanding Jackson's victory over Milroy,
anticipated that Banks would leave the Valley. Jackson thought
otherwise, and Jackson was right. After the bloody repulse at Malvern
Hill, when his generals reported the terrible confusion in the
Confederate ranks, he simply stated his opinion that the enemy was
retreating, and went to sleep again. A week later he suggested that
the whole army should move against Pope, for McClellan, he said,
would never dare to march on Richmond. At Sharpsburg, as the shells
cut the trees to pieces in the West Wood, and the heavy masses of
Federal infantry filled the fields in front, he told his medical
director that McClellan had done his worst. At Fredericksburg, after
the first day's battle, he believed that the enemy was already
defeated, and, anticipating their escape under cover of the darkness,
he advised a night attack with the bayonet. His knowledge of his
adversary's character, derived, in great degree, from his close
observation of every movement, enabled him to predict with
astonishing accuracy exactly how he would act under given
circumstances.
Nor can he be charged in any single instance with neglect of
precautions by which the risks of war are diminished. He appears to
have thought out and to have foreseen--and here his imaginative power
aided him--every combination that could be made against him, and to
have provided for every possible emergency. He was never surprised,
never disconcerted, never betrayed into a false manoeuvre. Although
on some occasions his success fell short of his expectations, the
fault was not his; his strategy was always admirable, but fortune, in
one guise or another--the indiscipline of the cavalry, the
inefficiency of subordinates, the difficulties of the
country--interfered with the full accomplishment of his designs. But
whatever could be done to render fortune powerless that Jackson did.
By means of his cavalry, by forced marches, by the careful selection
of his line of march, of his camps, of his positions, of his
magazines, and lastly, by his consistent reticence, he effectually
concealed from the Federals both his troops and his designs. Never
surprised himself, he seldom failed to surprise his enemies, if not
tactically--that is, while they were resting in their camps--at least
strategically. Kernstown came as a surprise to Banks, McDowell to
Fremont. Banks believed Jackson to be at Harrisonburg when he had
already defea
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