h, believed him capable of any task, invincible except by
fate. It never, indeed, fell to Jackson's lot to lead a great army or
to plan a great campaign. The operations in the Valley, although
decisive in their results, were comparatively insignificant, in
respect both of the numbers employed and of the extent of the
theatre. Jackson was not wholly independent. His was but a secondary
role, and he had to weigh at every turn the orders and instructions
of his superiors. His hand was never absolutely free. His authority
did not reach beyond certain limits, and his operations were confined
to one locality. He was never permitted to cross the border, and
"carry the war into Africa." Nor when he joined Lee before Richmond
was the restraint removed. In the campaign against Pope, and in the
reduction of Harper's Ferry, he was certainly entrusted with tasks
which led to a complete severance from the main body, but the
severance was merely temporary. He was the most trusted of Lee's
lieutenants, but he was only a lieutenant. He had never the same
liberty of action as those of his contemporaries who rose to historic
fame--as Lee himself, as Johnston or Beauregard, as Grant, or
Sherman, or as Sheridan--and consequently he had never a real
opportunity for revealing the height and breadth of his military
genius.
The Civil War was prolific of great leaders. The young American
generals, inexperienced as they were in dealing with large armies,
and compelled to improvise their tactics as they improvised their
staff, displayed a talent for command such as soldiers more regularly
trained could hardly have surpassed. Neither the deficiencies of
their material nor the difficulties of the theatre of war were to be
lightly overcome; and yet their methods displayed a refreshing
originality. Not only in mechanical auxiliaries did the inventive
genius of their race find scope. The principles which govern
civilised warfare, the rules which control the employment of each
arm, the technical and mechanical arts, were rapidly modified to the
exigencies of the troops and of the country. Cavalry, intrenchments,
the railway, the telegraph, balloons, signalling, were all used in a
manner which had been hitherto unknown. Monitors and torpedoes were
for the first time seen, and even the formations of infantry were
made sufficiently elastic to meet the requirements of a modern
battle-field. Nor was the conduct of the operations fettered by an
adherence t
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