recognition, though rather a confused one, of this anomaly,
that inspired the ingenious compromise invented by the Recess Committee
for introducing an element of popular control. But what a light the
compromise throws on the anomaly which evoked it! Is it common sense to
make these elaborate arrangements for promoting an Irish Department on
an Irish popular basis while recoiling in terror from the prospect of
crowning them with a Minister responsible to ah Irish Parliament? The
consequence is that even in this solitary example of an Irish
Department under semi-popular control we see the subtle taint of Crown
Colony Government. Popular opinion, acting indirectly, first through the
Council and then through the Boards, can legally paralyze the Department
by declining to appropriate money in the way it prescribes, while
possessing no legal power to enforce a different policy or change the
personnel of administration. This is only an object-lesson. I hasten to
add that such a paralysis has never taken place, though some acrimonious
controversy, natural enough under the anomalous state of things, has
arisen over the office of Vice-President. There is now only one means by
which Irish opinion can, if it be so disposed, displace the holder of
the office, and that is a thoroughly unreliable and unhealthy means,
namely, through pressure brought to bear by one or other of the Irish
Parliamentary parties upon a newly elected British Ministry.[53] But why
in the world should the British party pendulum determine an important
Irish matter like this? Why, _a fortiori_, should it determine the
appointment to the office of Chief Secretary, the irresponsible Prime
Minister, or, rather the autocrat of Ireland? It is the _reductio ad
absurdum_ of the Union.

The Department commands a large measure of confidence. It would command
far greater confidence if it were responsible to an Irish Parliament;
but Irishmen are sensible enough to perceive that as long as the Union
lasts, everyone is interested in making the existing system work
smoothly and well. The general policy as laid down in the first
instance, by the first Vice-President, Sir Horace Plunkett, has been
sound and wise;[54] to proceed slowly, while building up a staff of
trained instructors, inspectors, organizers; to devote money and labour
mainly to education, both industrial and agricultural, and to evoke
self-reliance and initiative in the people by, so far as possible,
spending