ed to
identify him. But, for the sake of illustration, let us assume that we
think of him as 'the first Chancellor of the German Empire'. Here all
the words are abstract except 'German'. The word 'German' will, again,
have different meanings for different people. To some it will recall
travels in Germany, to some the look of Germany on the map, and so on.
But if we are to obtain a description which we know to be applicable,
we shall be compelled, at some point, to bring in a reference to a
particular with which we are acquainted. Such reference is involved in
any mention of past, present, and future (as opposed to definite dates),
or of here and there, or of what others have told us. Thus it would seem
that, in some way or other, a description known to be applicable to a
particular must involve some reference to a particular with which we
are acquainted, if our knowledge about the thing described is not to be
merely what follows _logically_ from the description. For example, 'the
most long-lived of men' is a description involving only universals,
which must apply to some man, but we can make no judgements concerning
this man which involve knowledge about him beyond what the description
gives. If, however, we say, 'The first Chancellor of the German Empire
was an astute diplomatist', we can only be assured of the truth of our
judgement in virtue of something with which we are acquainted--usually a
testimony heard or read. Apart from the information we convey to others,
apart from the fact about the actual Bismarck, which gives importance
to our judgement, the thought we really have contains the one or more
particulars involved, and otherwise consists wholly of concepts.

All names of places--London, England, Europe, the Earth, the Solar
System--similarly involve, when used, descriptions which start from some
one or more particulars with which we are acquainted. I suspect that
even the Universe, as considered by metaphysics, involves such a
connexion with particulars. In logic, on the contrary, where we are
concerned not merely with what does exist, but with whatever might or
could exist or be, no reference to actual particulars is involved.

It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only known
by description, we often _intend_ to make our statement, not in the form
involving the description, but about the actual thing described. That
is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we