o a single object, which could be said
to be what is believed. If belief were so regarded, we should find that,
like acquaintance, it would not admit of the opposition of truth and
falsehood, but would have to be always true. This may be made clear
by examples. Othello believes falsely that Desdemona loves Cassio. We
cannot say that this belief consists in a relation to a single object,
'Desdemona's love for Cassio', for if there were such an object, the
belief would be true. There is in fact no such object, and therefore
Othello cannot have any relation to such an object. Hence his belief
cannot possibly consist in a relation to this object.

It might be said that his belief is a relation to a different object,
namely 'that Desdemona loves Cassio'; but it is almost as difficult to
suppose that there is such an object as this, when Desdemona does not
love Cassio, as it was to suppose that there is 'Desdemona's love for
Cassio'. Hence it will be better to seek for a theory of belief which
does not make it consist in a relation of the mind to a single object.

It is common to think of relations as though they always held between
two terms, but in fact this is not always the case. Some relations
demand three terms, some four, and so on. Take, for instance, the
relation 'between'. So long as only two terms come in, the relation
'between' is impossible: three terms are the smallest number that render
it possible. York is between London and Edinburgh; but if London and
Edinburgh were the only places in the world, there could be nothing
which was between one place and another. Similarly _jealousy_ requires
three people: there can be no such relation that does not involve three
at least. Such a proposition as 'A wishes B to promote C's marriage with
D' involves a relation of four terms; that is to say, A and B and C and
D all come in, and the relation involved cannot be expressed otherwise
than in a form involving all four. Instances might be multiplied
indefinitely, but enough has been said to show that there are relations
which require more than two terms before they can occur.

The relation involved in _judging_ or _believing_ must, if falsehood is
to be duly allowed for, be taken to be a relation between several terms,
not between two. When Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, he
must not have before his mind a single object, 'Desdemona's love for
Cassio', or 'that Desdemona loves Cassio ', for that would require