, which is composed
exclusively of the _objects_ of the belief, in the same order as they
had in the belief, with the relation which was one of the objects
occurring now as the cement that binds together the other objects of the
belief. On the other hand, when a belief is _false_, there is no such
complex unity composed only of the objects of the belief. If Othello
believes _falsely_ that Desdemona loves Cassio, then there is no such
complex unity as 'Desdemona's love for Cassio'.
Thus a belief is _true_ when it _corresponds_ to a certain associated
complex, and _false_ when it does not. Assuming, for the sake of
definiteness, that the objects of the belief are two terms and a
relation, the terms being put in a certain order by the 'sense' of
the believing, then if the two terms in that order are united by the
relation into a complex, the belief is true; if not, it is false. This
constitutes the definition of truth and falsehood that we were in search
of. Judging or believing is a certain complex unity of which a mind is
a constituent; if the remaining constituents, taken in the order which
they have in the belief, form a complex unity, then the belief is true;
if not, it is false.
Thus although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, yet they
are in a sense extrinsic properties, for the condition of the truth of
a belief is something not involving beliefs, or (in general) any mind
at all, but only the _objects_ of the belief. A mind, which believes,
believes truly when there is a _corresponding_ complex not involving the
mind, but only its objects. This correspondence ensures truth, and its
absence entails falsehood. Hence we account simultaneously for the two
facts that beliefs (a) depend on minds for their _existence_, (b) do not
depend on minds for their _truth_.
We may restate our theory as follows: If we take such a belief as
'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio', we will call Desdemona
and Cassio the _object-terms_, and loving the _object-relation_. If
there is a complex unity 'Desdemona's love for Cassio', consisting of
the object-terms related by the object-relation in the same order as
they have in the belief, then this complex unity is called the _fact
corresponding to the belief_. Thus a belief is true when there is a
corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding fact.
It will be seen that minds do not _create_ truth or falsehood. They
create beliefs, but when once t
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