Project Gutenberg's The Problems of Philosophy, by Bertrand Russell
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Title: The Problems of Philosophy
Author: Bertrand Russell
Release Date: June, 2004 [EBook #5827]
Posting Date: May 2, 2009
Language: English
Character set encoding: ASCII
*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY ***
Produced by Gordon Keener
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
By Bertrand Russell
PREFACE
In the following pages I have confined myself in the main to those
problems of philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say
something positive and constructive, since merely negative criticism
seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge occupies a
larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some topics
much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all.
I have derived valuable assistance from unpublished writings of G. E.
Moore and J. M. Keynes: from the former, as regards the relations
of sense-data to physical objects, and from the latter as regards
probability and induction. I have also profited greatly by the
criticisms and suggestions of Professor Gilbert Murray.
1912
CHAPTER I. APPEARANCE AND REALITY
Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no
reasonable man could doubt it? This question, which at first sight might
not seem difficult, is really one of the most difficult that can
be asked. When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a
straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the
study of philosophy--for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer
such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in
ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring
all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the
vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.
In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer
scrutiny, are found to be so full of apparent contradictions that only a
great amount of thought enables us to know what it is that we really may
believe. In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our
present experien
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