acquainted-with-sense-datum'.
Further, we know the truth 'I am acquainted with this sense-datum'. It
is hard to see how we could know this truth, or even understand what is
meant by it, unless we were acquainted with something which we call 'I'.
It does not seem necessary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more
or less permanent person, the same to-day as yesterday, but it does seem
as though we must be acquainted with that thing, whatever its nature,
which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-data. Thus, in some
sense it would seem we must be acquainted with our Selves as opposed
to our particular experiences. But the question is difficult, and
complicated arguments can be adduced on either side. Hence, although
acquaintance with ourselves seems _probably_ to occur, it is not wise to
assert that it undoubtedly does occur.
We may therefore sum up as follows what has been said concerning
acquaintance with things that exist. We have acquaintance in sensation
with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of
what may be called the inner sense--thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.;
we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either
of the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, it is probable,
though not certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which
is aware of things or has desires towards things.
In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also
have acquaintance with what we shall call _universals_, that is to say,
general ideas, such as _whiteness_, _diversity_, _brotherhood_, and so
on. Every complete sentence must contain at least one word which stands
for a universal, since all verbs have a meaning which is universal. We
shall return to universals later on, in Chapter IX; for the present, it
is only necessary to guard against the supposition that whatever we can
be acquainted with must be something particular and existent. Awareness
of universals is called _conceiving_, and a universal of which we are
aware is called a _concept_.
It will be seen that among the objects with which we are acquainted
are not included physical objects (as opposed to sense-data), nor other
people's minds. These things are known to us by what I call 'knowledge
by description', which we must now consider.
By a 'description' I mean any phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' or
'the so-and-so'. A phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' I shall call an
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