f were about all the Union
people, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at the
Monocacy when Sheridan arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had been
done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the
written instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter and
directed to that officer.

Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being
cavalry. Early had about the same number, but the superior ability of
the National commander over the Confederate commander was so great that
all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than
counterbalanced by this circumstance. As I had predicted, Early was
soon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and
Maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. The importance of the
valley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but
not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out
from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces
about his capital. I therefore gave orders for another move to the
north side of the James River, to threaten Richmond. Hancock's corps,
part of the 10th corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalry
were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the
13th-14th of August. A threatening position was maintained for a number
of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard
fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything
like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present
themselves which would insure great success. General Meade was left in
command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and
was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and
himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an
effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There was
no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no
more reinforcements were sent to the valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements
being sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had
made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to
the valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven
hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having