ot exceed, if they reach,
60,000. With Wool and Dix added to those mentioned, I have not, outside of
your army, 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending you
50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd. If,
in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that
I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of
such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask
impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take
Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army,
material and personal, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again
as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of
300,000, which I accept.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, D.C. July 2, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:

Your several despatches of yesterday to Secretary of War and myself
received. I did say, and now repeat, I would be exceedingly glad for some
reinforcements from you. Still do not send a man if in your judgment it
will endanger any point you deem important to hold, or will force you to
give up or weaken or delay the Chattanooga expedition.

Please tell me could you not make me a flying visit for consultation
without endangering the Service in your department.

A. LINCOLN.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, July 2, 1862.

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I herewith return to your honorable body, in which it originated, an
act entitled "An act to provide for additional medical officers of the
volunteer service," without my approval.

My reason for so doing is that I have approved an act of the same title
passed by Congress after the passage of the one first mentioned for the
express purpose of correcting errors in and superseding the same, as I am
informed.

A. LINCOLN.

CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS.

(Private and Confidential.)

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 3, 1862.10.30 A.M.

GOVERNOR WASHBURN, Maine [and other governors] I should not want the half
of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional
troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the war in two
weeks. But time is everything, and if I get 50,000 new men in a month, I
shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same month, having gained only
30,000, with the difference between old and new troops sti