ection, especially as such persons would be within the general
pardoning power and also the special provision for pardon and amnesty
contained in this act.

It is also provided that the slaves of persons convicted under these
sections shall be free. I think there is an unfortunate form of expression
rather than a substantial objection in this. It is startling to say that
Congress can free a slave within a State, and yet if it were said the
ownership of the slave had first been transferred to the nation and that
Congress had then liberated him the difficulty would at once vanish. And
this is the real case. The traitor against the General Government forfeits
his slave at least as justly as he does any other property, and he
forfeits both to the government against which be offends. The government,
so far as there can be ownership, thus owns the forfeited slaves, and the
question for Congress in regard to them is, "Shall they be made free or
be sold to new masters?" I perceive no objection to Congress deciding in
advance that they shall be free. To the high honor of Kentucky, as I am
informed, she is the owner of some slaves by escheat, and has sold none,
but liberated all. I hope the same is true of some other States. Indeed,
I do not believe it will be physically possible for the General Government
to return persons so circumstanced to actual slavery. I believe there
would be physical resistance to it which could neither be turned aside
by argument nor driven away by force. In this view I have no objection to
this feature of the bill. Another matter involved in these two sections,
and running through other parts of the act, will be noticed hereafter.

I perceive no objection to the third or fourth sections.

So far as I wish to notice the fifth and sixth sections, they may be
considered together. That the enforcement of these sections would do no
injustice to the persons embraced within them, is clear. That those who
make a causeless war should be compelled to pay the cost of it, is too
obviously just to be called in question. To give governmental protection
to the property of persons who have abandoned it, and gone on a crusade to
overthrow the same government, is absurd, if considered in the mere light
of justice. The severest justice may not always be the best policy.
The principle of seizing and appropriating the property of the persons
embraced within these sections is certainly not very objectionable, but a
justly