you cannot subsist
your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that
point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army
at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad
transportation as you would have to do, without the railroad last named.
He now wagons from Culpepper Court-House, which is just about twice as far
as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more
than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be
pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Perry
to Winchester; but it wastes an the remainder of autumn to give it to you,
and, in fact, ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be
ignored.

Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is "to operate
upon the enemy's communications as much as possible, without exposing your
own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in
your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would
break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours?
You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he
gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do
but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall
upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.

Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer to Richmond than the enemy
is, by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach
there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a
march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The
roads are as good on yours as on his.

You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below
instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was, that this
would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize if
he would permit. If he should move northward, I would follow him
closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his
communications, and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him,
fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to
beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say "try;" if we never try,
we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither
north or south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot
beat him when he bears the was