aw, to retain the letter, and I took it back, but I now return
it to you for record if you wish it.

I beg leave to say that my resignation is not sent in in any spirit of
insubordination, but, as I before said, simply to relieve you from any
embarrassment in changing commanders where lack of confidence may have
rendered it necessary.

The bearer of this will bring me any answer, or I should be glad to hear
from you by telegraph in cipher.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. E. BURNSIDE,

Major-General, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, January 7, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Commanding, etc., Falmouth:

GENERAL:--Your communication of the 5th was delivered to me by your
aide-de-camp at 12 M. to-day.

In all my communications and interviews with you since you took command
of the Army of the Potomac I have advised a forward movement across the
Rappahannock. At our interview at Warrenton I urged that you should cross
by the fords above Fredericksburg rather than to fall down to that
place; and when I left you at Warrenton it was understood that at least
a considerable part of your army would cross by the fords, and I so
represented to the President. It was this modification of the plan
proposed by you that I telegraphed you had received his approval. When
the attempt at Fredericksburg was abandoned, I advised you to renew the
attempt at some other point, either in whole or in part, to turn the
enemy's works, or to threaten their wings or communications; in other
words, to keep the enemy occupied till a favorable opportunity offered to
strike a decisive blow. I particularly advised you to use your cavalry
and light artillery upon his communications, and attempt to cut off his
supplies and engage him at an advantage.

In all our interviews I have urged that our first object was, not
Richmond, but the defeat or scattering of Lee's army, which threatened
Washington and the line of the upper Potomac. I now recur to these things
simply to remind you of the general views which I have expressed, and
which I still hold.

The circumstances of the case, however, have somewhat changed since the
early part of November. The chances of an extended line of operations
are now, on account of the advanced season, much less than then. But
the chances are still in our favor to meet and defeat the enemy on the
Rappahannock, if we can effect a crossing