f your force and forward it by the nearest and quickest
route by way of Baltimore and Washington to Richmond. It is believed
that the quickest route would be by way of Columbus, Ky., and up the Ohio
River. But in detaching your force the President directs that it be done
in such a way as to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with
the movement against Chattanooga and East Tennessee. This condition being
observed, the forces to be detached and the routes they are to be sent are
left to your own judgment.

The direction to send these forces immediately is rendered imperative by
a serious reverse suffered by General McClellan before Richmond yesterday,
the full extent of which is not yet known.

You will acknowledge the receipt of this despatch, stating the day and
hour it is received, and inform me what your action will be, so that we
may take measures to aid in river and railroad transportation.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1862.

GENERAL BURNSIDE:

I think you had better go, with any reinforcements you can spare, to
General McClellan.

A. LINCOLN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June, 28, 1862

MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Newbern:

We have intelligence that General McClellan has been attacked in large
force and compelled to fall back toward the James River. We are not
advised of his exact condition, but the President directs that you shall
send him all the reinforcements from your command to the James River that
you can safely do without abandoning your own position. Let it be infantry
entirely, as he said yesterday that he had cavalry enough.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, June 28, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:

Save your army, at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as we can.
Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not
said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements. I thought
you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I
could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you
feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is
the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected
Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington,
he would have been upon us before the troops could have g