ty not already wrested from the
government, and to collect the revenue, relying for the rest on time,
discussion, and the ballot-box. It promised a continuance of the mails, at
government expense, to the very people who were resisting the government;
and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to any of the
people, or any of their rights. Of all that which a President might
constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, everything was
forborne without which it was believed possible to keep the government on
foot.

On the 5th of March (the present incumbent's first full day in office), a
letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th
of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of March, was
by that department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the
professional opinion of the writer that reinforcements could not be thrown
into that fort within the time for his relief, rendered necessary by the
limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the
same, with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well-disciplined
men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his command, and
their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures of Major Anderson's
letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General Scott,
who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion. On reflection,
however, he took full time, consulting with other officers, both of
the army and the navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly but
decidedly to the same conclusion as before. He also stated at the
same time that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the
government, or could be raised and brought to the ground within the time
when the provisions in the fort would be exhausted. In a purely military
point of view, this reduced the duty of the administration in the case to
the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort.

It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the
circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity under which
it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would
be construed as a part of a voluntary policy; that at home it would
discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far
to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that in fact, it would
be our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed.
Star