vation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be reached
Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last would be a clear indication
of policy, and would better enable the country to accept the evacuation of
Fort Sumter as a military necessity. An order was at once directed to be
sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort
Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and
slower route by sea. The first return news from the order was received
just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was that
the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been
transferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of
the late administration (and of the existence of which the present
administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too
vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had refused to land the
troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens before a crisis would be reached
at Fort Sumter was impossible--rendered so by the near exhaustion
of provisions in the latter-named fort. In precaution against such a
conjuncture, the government had, a few days before, commenced preparing
an expedition as well adapted as might be to relieve Fort Sumter, which
expedition was intended to be ultimately used, or not, according to
circumstances. The strongest anticipated case for using it was now
presented, and it was resolved to send it forward. As had been intended
in this contingency, it was also resolved to notify the governor of South
Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made to provision the
fort; and that, if the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no
effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice, or
in case of an attack upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given;
whereupon the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even
awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition.

It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in
no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants. They
well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit
aggression upon them. They knew--they were expressly notified--that the
giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all
which would on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting
so much, should provoke more. They knew that this government desired