so long as the unity of body and soul is regarded as merely external
and accidental, it is impossible to think that the passions which
arise out of this unity can be transformed into the embodiment and
expression of reason.

Descartes, indeed, points out that every passion has a lower and a
higher form, and while in its lower or primary form it is based on the
obscure ideas produced by the motion of the animal spirits, in its
higher form it is connected with the clear and distinct judgments of
reason regarding good and evil. If, however, the unity of soul and
body be a unity of composition, there is an element of obscurity in
the judgments of passion which cannot be made clear, an element in
desire that cannot be spiritualized. If the mind be external to the
passions it can only impose upon them an external rule of moderation.
On such a theory no _ideal_ morality is possible to man in his present
state; for, in order to the attainment of such an ideal morality, it
would be necessary that the accidental element obtruded into his life
as a spiritual being by his connexion with the body should be
expelled. What can be attained under present conditions is only to
abstract so far as is possible from external things, and those
relations to external things into which passion brings us. Hence the
great importance which Descartes attaches to the distinction between
things in our power and things not in our power. What is not in our
power includes all outward things, and therefore it is our highest
wisdom to regard them as determined by an absolute fate, or the
eternal decree of God. We cease to wish for the impossible; and
therefore to subdue our passions we only need to convince ourselves
that no effort of ours can enable us to secure their objects. On the
other hand, that which is within our power, and which, therefore, we
cannot desire too earnestly, is virtue. But virtue in this abstraction
from all objects of desire is simply the harmony of reason with
itself, the [Greek: ataraxia] of the Stoic under a slight change of
aspect. Thus in ethics, as in metaphysics, Descartes ends not with a
reconciliation of the opposed elements, but with a dualism, or at
best, with a unity which is the result of abstraction.

_The Philosophy of Malebranche._--Malebranche was prepared, by the
ascetic training of the cloister and the teaching of Augustine, to bring
to clear cons