no doubt in that respect. Doubt still
exists about eight others. If they are proved to be in the same case
as the former, they will be shot in the same way. The two men shot at
Lourani were put to death because they were known to be _Comitadjis_.
The other two, whose houses were burnt down, are likewise _Comitadjis_:
they would have been shot, if they were not away: they shall be, if
they are caught. If a church has been burnt down, it was because it
had been transformed into a magazine for arms. If barley has been
carried away, it has been paid for or requisitioned." After some more
statements of the same enlightening kind, the gallant soldier
concludes: "To sum up, the Greek Government organizes bands and
maintains them. The security of our Army in the Orient exacts their
suppression. I have given orders to put to death all irregulars.
These orders have been carried out: they shall continue to be carried
out." [4]

It was by precisely similar arguments that General von Bissing
justified his severities in Belgium: with this difference, that in
Greece the danger never existed. Comitadjis--bands of irregulars--did
exist; it would have been strange if the adherents of the King had not
done everything to counter the efforts of his enemies. Long before
this period the French Secret Service, Admiral Dartige du Fournet tells
us, had been busy equipping guerillas on the frontier.[5] Further, in
the mainland, as in the islands, the Venizelist recruiting sergeants
sought "volunteers" by force: "How many villages had to be surrounded
by constabulary. . . . How much shooting had to be done to keep the
men of military age from escaping. . . . How many deserters or those
unwilling to serve had to be rounded up from hiding places!" exclaims
General Sarrail.[6] Some of the recruits thus enlisted snatched at the
earliest opportunity of regaining {180} their freedom: they fell in
during the day, and at night they fled with their arms.

The assertion that these bands were organized and maintained by the
Greek Government to harass the Allies and keep the line of
communication with Albania open, with a view to an eventual junction
between the forces of King Constantine and those of the German Emperor,
rested on evidence which, for some obscure reason, was not produced.[7]
But it supplied pretexts for action the true objects of which were not
obscure.

Despite his press-gangs, in six months M. Venizelos had only succeeded