tence of
Greece," which aimed at securing her against external aggression, the
interpretation that it referred to her form of government and conferred
a right of interference in her internal affairs.

The present interference, clearly, had no more legal basis than all the
other invasions to which Greece had submitted during the War under
protest. Casuistry was merely called in to cloak the exigencies of
policy: King Constantine's dethronement was decreed, not because it was
lawful, but because France required it, and England, for good reasons,
could not let France bring it about alone: what Russia thought of the
transaction, she soon let the whole world know with disconcerting
bluntness. Petrograd not only withdrew her troops from the
performance, but made short work of the "guarantee" and "protection"
quibbles by roundly declaring that "the choice of the form of
government in Greece, as well as its administrative organization,
appertains exclusively to the Greek people." [9]

Meanwhile M. Jonnart sped eastward, eager and determined to serve the
Imperialist ambitions of the French Republic in the Orient. His
mandate gave him unlimited choice of means, diplomatic and military,
and he fully justified the trust placed in his tact. On the maxim
that, the more prompt the display of force, the less likely the
occasion to use it, he decided, contrary to the instructions he had
received in London, not to wait and see whether {190} King Constantine
meditated hostile acts or not; he arranged for the necessary naval
measures with Admiral Gauchet, whom he met off Corfu, and, after a
brief stop in the Road of Salamis, he hastened to Salonica, where he
arranged with General Sarrail for the military measures: a simultaneous
invasion of Thessaly, occupation of the Isthmus of Corinth, and a
landing at Athens. At the same time he conferred with M. Venizelos,
who pronounced all these arrangements excellent, and suggested that,
after the removal of the King, he must give the public mind time to
calm down before returning to Athens: in the interval M. Zaimis might
be left in power. The period of transition should perhaps last several
months: a prudent counsel with which M. Jonnart fully concurred: both
he and M. Ribot recognized the danger of hurrying the return of the
Cretan to a city which he had been describing as ready to embrace him.
The programme settled in all its details, M. Jonnart left Salonica with
General Regnault, who