n ex-President
of the Chamber, who had been imprisoned at the age of seventy-eight in
the Syngros gaol, was released by death.
All the members of the Skouloudis Cabinet, with the exception of
Admiral Coundouriotis, Minister of Marine who had afterwards proved his
patriotism by enlisting under the Cretan's banner, were arraigned for
high treason, {210} referring mainly to the surrender of Fort Rupel.
The preliminary examination dragged on from year to year and produced
only evidence which established the innocence of the accused.[4] One
of them, ex-Premier Rallis, in April 1920, after being for years
libelled as a traitor, suddenly found himself exempted by Royal Decree
from further persecution, because at that time M. Venizelos conceived
the hope that this statesman might be induced to undertake the
leadership of an Opposition accepting his regime. The rest,
particularly M. Skouloudis and M. Dragoumis, one aged eighty-two and
the other seventy-seven, after a long confinement in the Evangelismos
Hospital, remained to the end under strict surveillance, with gendarmes
guarding their houses and dogging their footsteps.
The Lambros Cabinet was similarly harassed, until one of its members
turned Venizelist and three others died; among the latter M. Lambros
himself and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Zalocostas. Both
these gentlemen, though in poor health, had been confined on desolate
islets of the Archipelago, where they were kept without proper medical
attendance or any of the comforts which their condition required, and
were only brought home to expire.
In each case--as also in that of the soldiers responsible for the
surrender of the Cavalla garrison, whose "treasonable" conduct became
likewise the subject of judicial investigation--trial was sedulously
deferred by a variety of ingenious contrivances; nothing being more
remote from the Government's mind than an intention to draw the truth
into the light. The motive of these proceedings doubtless was one of
policy chiefly--to ruin the enemies of the regime in public esteem by
branding them as traitors, even if no conviction could be obtained.
But policy was not the only element. To judge by the harshness
displayed, there was the personal factor, too. M. Venizelos had had a
feud with these men and had vanquished them. They were men whom, all
things considered, it was more a shame to fight than an honour to
vanquish--and they were humbled: they were in his
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