once more for
Greece." In fact, once more Constantine was made the scape-goat for
disasters for which he was in no way responsible--disasters from which
he would undoubtedly have saved his country, had he been allowed to
pursue his own sober course.
M. Venizelos would not go back to Athens until the excitement subsided,
lest people should think, he said, that he had had any part in the
revolution: but undertook the defence of the national interests in the
Entente capitals. His mission was to obtain such support as would
enable him to save Greece something out of the ruin which his insane
imperialism had brought upon her, so that he might be in a position to
point out to his countrymen that he alone, after the disastrous failure
of Constantine, had been able to secure their partial rehabilitation.
That accomplished, he might then hope to become a perpetual Prime
Minister or President.
France made it quite clear that no changes in Greece could alter her
policy: however satisfied she might be at the second disappearance of
the antipathetic monarch, it should not be supposed that, even were a
Republic to be set up, presided over by the Great Cretan, her attitude
on territorial questions would be transformed: Thrace, after Ionia,
must revert to Turkey. French statesmen longed for the complete
demolition of their own handiwork. M. Poincare, in 1922, was proud to
do what the Duc de Broglie ninety years before scoffed at as an {236}
unthinkable folly: "_Abandonner la Grece aujourd'hui, detruire de nos
propres mains l'ouvrage que nos propres mains ont presque acheve!_"
England's expressed attitude was not characterized by a like precision.
It is true that after the Greek debacle she dispatched ships and troops
to prevent the Straits from falling into the hands of the Turks; but in
the matter of Thrace she had already yielded to France: and how the
restoration of Turkish rule in Europe can be reconciled with the
freedom of the Straits remains to be seen.
What the future may have in store for Greece and Turkey is a matter of
comparatively small account. What is of great and permanent importance
is the divergence between the paths of France and England revealed by
the preceding analysis of events.
From this analysis have been carefully excluded such superficial
dissensions as always arise between allies after a war, and were
especially to be expected after a war in which every national
susceptibility was quickened t
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