a man sent to heal Hellas of the "dynastic canker," and expressed
the opinion that the healing could only be effected by "Prussian
methods." [13]
During the whole of May this concert of sophistry and calumny went on:
now sinking into low, deadly whispers; now swelling into an uproar that
rolled like a mighty, muddy river in flood through every Allied
capital, ministering to the inarticulate craving of the public for
fresh sensations, thrilling its nerves, and feeding its hate and fear
of King Constantine. At the end of the month the curtain went up, and
M. Venizelos stepped forward to {188} make the declaration for which
his instrumental music had prepared our minds: "I reject all idea of
reconciliation firmly, flatly, and finally!"
His confederates and subordinates, as usual, went further: Admiral
Coundouriotis: "Neither in this world nor in the next will I have
anything to do with King Constantine or his dynasty."
Minister Politis: "No compromise is possible between Liberal Greece and
the reigning dynasty."
Minister Averoff: "The one and most important thing is that the dynasty
of Constantine should, like the Turks, be turned bag and baggage out of
Greece." [14]
So the Great Cretan and his company had given up at last pretending
that their plot was not directed against their King, or that they
intended to postpone the settlement of their accounts with him till
after the War. Their relief must have been proportionate to the
strain: it is not hypocrisy, but the need of consistency that harasses
a hypocrite. But their outburst of candour was chiefly interesting as
an index to the attitude of the Powers from whom they derived their
significance.
France had long since made up her mind on the deposition of
Constantine, if not indeed on the subversion of the Greek throne.
Apart from the hold upon Greece which they would gain by placing her
under a ruler created by and consequently dependent on them, French
politicians did not lose sight of the popularity which the sacrifice of
a king--and that king, too, the Kaiser's brother-in-law--would earn
them among their own compatriots. Further, a triumph of French policy
over Greece was calculated to obscure in the eyes of the French public
the failure of French strategy against Bulgaria: "For me the
destruction of Athens the Germanic came second to the struggle against
Sofia," wrote General Sarrail[15]; and there were those who believed
that his expedition had for
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