tions. If Congress have
any power, they must have the whole power of the continent. Such a power
would not abridge the sovereignty of each State in any article relating
to its own government. The internal police of each State would be still
under the sole superintendence of its legislature. But in a matter that
equally respects all the States no individual State has more than a
thirteenth part of the legislative authority, and consequently has no
right to decide what measure shall or shall not take place on the
continent. A majority of the States _must_ decide; our confederation
cannot be permanent unless founded on that principle; nay, more, the
States cannot be said to be _united_ till such a principle is adopted in
its utmost latitude. If a single town or precinct could counteract the
will of a whole State, would there be any government in that State? It
is an established principle in government that the will of the minority
must submit to that of the majority; and a single State or a minority of
States ought to be disabled to resist the will of the majority, as much
as a town or county in any State is disabled to prevent the execution
of a statute law of the legislature. It is on this principle, and _this
alone_, that a free State can be governed; it is on this principle alone
that the American States can exist as a confederacy of republics. Either
the several States must continue separate, totally independent of each
other, and liable to all the evils of jealousy, dispute, and civil
dissension,--nay, liable to a civil war, upon any clashing of
interests,--or they must constitute a general head, composed of
representatives from all the States, and vested with the power of the
whole continent to enforce their decisions. There is no other
alternative. One of these events must inevitably take place, and the
revolution of a few years will verify the prediction."

In answering possible objections to the scheme, he rests in the power of
the people, who "forever keep the sole right of legislation in their own
representatives, but divest themselves wholly of any right to the
administration." He refuses to believe that there is any danger from
centralization so long as the people use the power which is vested in
them. "These things," he concludes, "demand our early and careful
attention: a general diffusion of knowledge; the encouragement of
industry, frugality, and virtue; and a sovereign power at the head of
the States. _A