ed, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and Turkey
was swung into line, the same condition held true. Germany and her
allies were a homogeneous unit, geographically considered. From the
point of view of land defense very little of Germany's frontiers
bordered upon enemy territory. The small section that confronted
France on the west and the larger section facing Russia on the east
were her only open points of attack. Her sea front except for the
small section near the mouth of the Rhine, was on the Baltic, and
secure from naval attack except by the Russian fleet, and Russia has
never been a naval power. Her Mediterranean outlet, near Trieste and
Fiume, menaced by the Mediterranean fleets of the allied powers, was
comparatively safe, for the Austrian fleet was an efficient fighting
unit, especially so for defense.

As opposed to this was the openness of England, France, and Russia
to naval attack. England has but a small proportion of land to
seacoast, and France is open to the sea on three sides. Russia,
fronting the Baltic, possessed an infinitely inferior fleet, to
which the Allies could send no reenforcement as long as the
Skagerrak and Cattegat Straits were the only way into the Baltic;
moreover, by the Kiel Canal, connecting the North Sea and the
Baltic, the remodeling of which was completed in a few months before
the declarations of war, a German naval fleet would possess an
enormous advantage over an allied fleet, endeavoring to force
entrance into the Baltic. In addition to this, while the Central
Powers could work together on both fronts with great ease, thanks to
the excellent system of German railways, Great Britain and France
had no means of direct communication with their great ally in the
east of Europe. Thus, in a measure, the Central Powers were not
attacking the Allies at any one time, though it might truly be said
that they were being attacked by the Allies. In the event of any
lack of synchronization between the plans of Russia and those of the
western allies, German and Austrian troops could be massed first on
one side of the field of operations and then on the other. Such
action was impossible to the Allies. At the time of the great German
advance on Paris, Russia could give no aid. At the time of the
German advance on Riga, Britain and France could give no aid. Both
German advances were checked and the invaders driven back, not by
the armies of the Allies, but by two non-interlocking parts of the