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France paid dearly. Some of her richest provinces were invaded and held all through the early part of the war by Germany, almost solely because her transportation of troops to the crucial point was not effective. The mere presence of the Germans over so large a section of French territory was due solely to the rapidity of the German mobilization, which was the result of long years of preparation. Even behind the Belgian screen France did not move rapidly enough to save herself, only barely rapidly enough to save Paris. The plan of General Joffre, which entailed a gradual retreat to let the Germans expand far from their base, while the French concentrated between the border and Paris, was a move determined, not by any special theory of war, nor yet by special configuration of the country, but by the slowness of mobilization. The initial success of Germany was a victory of thorough preparedness, the initial defeats of the French army were the results of military preparedness hampered by politics. As the campaign developed, the mobilization of the Germans on the west front was seen to have a double purpose. The armies of Von Kluck were to hold Belgium and the north of France, while the armies of the crown prince were to march through Luxemburg and batter down the Verdun-Belfort line. It has been shown how the rapid mobilization and gallant defense of Liege by the Belgians delayed the former. Without aircraft it was more than possible that, behind the screen of the forests of Luxemburg, France might not have known what forces were being concentrated on that frontier, and might have weakened the line to rush troops against Von Kluck. But the French aviators, who are the best in the world, were able to fly over the territory of Germany and Luxemburg where troops were mobilizing, and the information they sent down was sufficiently alarming to keep France from weakening the Franco-German fortress-defended line too seriously. This, again, handicapped France from being able to go to the support of Belgium. The dramatic plan of the crown prince's hammering march to Paris failed absolutely and completely by the successful defense of Verdun. [Illustration: German-French Frontier, Fortresses of.] CHAPTER XXVII BRITAIN--RUSSIA--AUSTRIA The initial mobilization of Great Britain was a matter as well managed as that of Germany. For precision there was nothing to choose as between them. Yet, comparing the German and B
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