armies of the Allies. At the same time, the susceptibility to attack
on both sides prevented the Central Powers from deflecting all their
men to either front, and thus by the mere existence of passive
menace, prevented the Central Powers from using their geographic
advantage to the full.

Their disadvantage, in the military sense of the recognition of
geographical conditions, was that the Central Powers had constantly
to bear in mind the necessity of fighting upon two fronts. Russian
activity, while important to Britain and France, was a matter with
which their policy had nothing to do; the coordination of movements
on the west front was a matter entirely outside the scope of the
operations of the Russian commanders. The German military staff, on
the other hand, had the task of constantly coordinating two separate
campaigns, to determine where the greatest number of men should be,
to avoid weakening the one side or the other at the wrong moment.

The advantages, again considered geographically, greatly outweigh
the disadvantages. The first of these was the homogeneity of the
Central Powers. A general could attend a war council in Berlin in
the evening, and one in Vienna the next morning. The influence of
Germany was an understood thing, moreover, and in Vienna there was a
readiness to accept and carry out the policies of the German
military staff. There was also a geographical homogeneity, due to
modern facility of communication. Not only in mobilization, but in
the entire conduct of the war, the geographic nearness of points in
Germany and Austria was brought about by an excellent east and west
railway system. The disadvantage of fighting on two fronts was
partly compensated by the fact that within three days enormous
masses of men could be moved from Galicia to the Rhine, or from the
Belgian frontier to the wastes of East Prussia. In all Europe there
is no stretch of land so well suited by nature for this task of
fighting upon two fronts as the area of the combined Austrian and
German Empires. This is emphasized by the topography of the Baltic
Plain, the Rhine and Danube valleys. One might say, in a measure,
that this stretch of territory has not wasted any of its natural
mountain defenses by flinging them athwart the territory. Thus the
Vosges defend against France, the Alps against Italy, the
Transylvanian Alps against Rumania--in the event of that nation
entering the war with Russia--the Carpathians behind Galici