ation of the time limit, the mobilization of the Serbian army
took place."
The Great powers were not willing to go to war without first trying
mediation between the two kingdoms in southeastern Europe, and even
Russia, which was known to be a potential ally of Serbia, showed a
disposition to use diplomacy before force. When the demands made by
Austria-Hungary in her note of July 25, 1914, became known in the
Russian capital, the following note was immediately telegraphed to
Vienna:
"The communication [the circular note quoted above] made by
Austria-Hungary to the powers the day after the presentation of the
ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the powers which is quite
insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to
smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.
"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and
fatal to all the powers, which may result from the course of action
followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be
above all essential that the period allowed for the Serbian reply
should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness
to inform the powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the
Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally
allow them sufficient time to study them.
"In this case, if the powers were convinced that certain of the
Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to
offer advice to the Serbian Government.
"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render
nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to
the powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of
international relations."
A copy of this note was at the same time sent to London with the
addenda: "M. Sazonoff (Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) hopes
that his Britannic Majesty's Government will share the point of view
set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to
furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna."
But on the same day, July 25, 1914, the Government at Vienna
informed the powers that the note to Serbia was not an ultimatum; it
was merely a demarche, and in it Austria had threatened to start
military preparations, not operations. The requested delay,
therefore, was not granted. That day was eventful in London, too,
for the Foreign Office was notified by the German Ambassador that
though Germany had not been appri
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