receiver, before its observation could be delivered, thus immensely
curtailing the usefulness and efficiency of the aeroplane observation.
Owing to the above conditions, aeroplanes could only be used for the
counter-batteries firing on hostile artillery.

As regards trench mortars, the supply was hopelessly inadequate. I
cannot give the exact figures, but I believe there were not a dozen at
Helles during the whole period I was there, and these were of such an
indifferent type as to be practically useless, and for this reason no
one bothered about them. No provision appears to have been made for the
supply of such necessities of trench warfare by the Home Authorities.
This appears to be indefensible, as I believe very early in the
operations their provision was specially asked for by G.H.Q. The
absolute failure to supply such articles of vital necessity eventually
led to the French C.-in-C. at Helles lending the British two demizel
trench mortars and large quantities of ammunition. These were manned by
artillery detachments, and by their magnificent work and the constant
demand from the Infantry for their services, it was conclusively proved
what an invaluable aid a sufficient supply of these weapons would have
been.

From the very first it was apparent to me that the number of British
guns at Helles was not sufficient to prepare and support simultaneous
Infantry attacks of the whole British Force at this end of the
Peninsula. In June I drew up a memorandum to G.H.Q. pointing this out
and asking for a big increase of guns, howitzers and ammunition. What
happened to this I cannot say. I only know that the guns and ammunition
asked for never materialized.

The whole story of the artillery at Helles may be summed up in the
following sentences: insufficiency of guns of every nature;
insufficiency of ammunition of every nature, especially of H.E.;
insufficient provision made by the Home Authorities for spare guns,
spare carriages, spare parts, adequate repairing workshops, or for a
regular daily, weekly or monthly supply of ammunition; guns provided
often of an obsolete pattern and so badly worn by previous use as to be
most inaccurate; lack of aeroplanes, trained observers and of all the
requisites for air observation; total failure to produce the trench
mortars and bombs to which the closeness of the opposing lines at Helles
would have lent themselves well--in short, total lack of organization at
home to provide even t