ile, the total amount
of ammunition which should be available at Helles early in August for
offensive action, and to maintain a reserve is:--

18 pr. 36,000 }
4.5 inch 2,000 } Plus any amounts saved
5 inch 4,000 } from normal daily expenditure.
6 inch 545 }
60 pr. 3,000 }

but it must be borne in mind that no replacements can be looked for
before August 16th.

6. The scope of your offensive action must be based upon these figures,
and it is thought that the most suitable objective will be the capture
of the Turkish trenches up to the line F. 13, G. 13, H. 13, and H. 12.
Plans for this operation should, therefore, be undertaken at once.

7. Pre-supposing that this attack is successful, and that the numbers at
your disposal admit of a further advance, the capture of the trenches on
the line H. 14 to H. 15, followed perhaps by the capture of Krithia
could then be undertaken, and plans for this action should be prepared
beforehand. But as the launching of this further attack must be entirely
dependent on unknown factors, a definite decision on this point cannot
be arrived at beforehand. It is, moreover, essential that the plan of
your first attack should not definitely commit your troops to a further
advance unless the trend of events should render such a course
desirable.

8. As regards the date for launching your first attack, it is thought
that the most favourable time would be shortly before the main
operations at Anzac begin, and you should therefore arrange for your
first attack to take place on the 4th August.

9. Beyond holding the enemy in front of them to their positions and
assisting you with artillery fire, the French will not be asked to take
part in your first attack, but, in the event of your reaching Krithia,
they will be directed to conform to your movements and to establish
themselves on the spurs leading up to Achi Baba.

I will ascertain the amount of artillery support and lean you can expect
from the C.E.O., and if the information arrives in time will attach it
as an appendix to this letter.

10. The possibility of the southern force being able to capture Achi
Baba has not been dealt with in this memorandum, as the attempt should
only be made in the event of large reinforcements being available for
the southern zone, and these must depend on the course of events in the
main theatre.

(_Signed_) W. P. BRAITH