s' Battle at Gaza; which it took months to
remove. At the battle of the 19th September, 1918, in Palestine
conditions were exactly the same. There was an absolute _embarras de
richesse_ of every artillery requisite. This wealth of artillery
material was supported in Palestine by a full complement of artillery,
aeroplanes, pilots and observers, the latter being all thoroughly
trained and efficient. In addition, by a sufficiency of fighting
aeroplanes with most efficient pilots, our artillery were adequately
guarded from sunrise to sunset from any hostile aeroplane observation.

In short, our air supremacy was undisputed and absolutely protected our
own artillery against damage and molestation from the hostile guns. On
the other hand, the enemy's artillery lay at our mercy directly their
gun positions were discovered.

The whole science of artillery and aeroplane co-operation had, of
course, been vastly extended and perfected since Gallipoli days, but the
point I wish to make is this: that in 1917 and 1918 the Palestine Front
was fitted out on the same scale, proportionately, as the Western Front;
whereas in 1915 this was not the case in the Dardanelles as regards
artillery, for instance, only one Division (the 29th) at Helles having
18-pr. guns and the Naval Division having been given no artillery at
all!

To put the matter shortly, whereas at Helles I had under my command no
more than 88 to 95 guns and howitzers of all natures with scarcely any
ammunition or aeroplanes to support four British Divisions; in Palestine
at Gaza I had at least 230 guns and howitzers (one-third of which were
of heavy calibre) with an abundance of ammunition and a sufficiency of
aeroplanes to support the attack of one and a half Divisions, the
remaining one and a half Divisions at Gaza being in reserve. At the
battle of 19th September, 1918, in Palestine I had, to the best of my
recollection, about 360 guns of all calibres to support four Divisions.
The terrible casualties suffered by our Infantry at Helles are well
known, and my feelings as Artillery Commander unable to give them
anything like the support they would have had in France or Flanders may
be guessed. But this was made up to me afterwards when I commanded the
artillery at Gaza, that strong fortress which was captured by the 21st
Army Corps, with certainly under 3,000 casualties and I believe with
under 2,000 killed and wounded. At Gaza the Turks were simply crushed by
our overwh