to secure Suvla Bay as a base for all the forces
operating in the northern zone. Owing to the difficult nature of the
terrain, it is possible that the attainment of this objective will, in
the first instance, require the use of the whole of the troops at your
disposal. Should, however, you find it possible to achieve this object
with only a portion of your force, your next step will be to give such
direct assistance as is in your power to the G.O.C. Anzac in his attack
on Hill 305, by an advance on Biyuk Anafarta, with the object of moving
up the eastern spurs of that hill.

4. Subject only to his final approval, the General Commanding gives you
an entirely free hand in the selection of your plan of operations.

He, however, directs your special attention to the fact that the hills
Yilghin and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to contain guns which can bring
fire to bear on the flank and rear of an attack on Hill 305, and that on
this account they assume an even greater importance in the first
instance than if they were considered merely part of a position covering
Suvla Bay. If, therefore, it is possible, without prejudice to the
attainment of your primary objective, to gain possession of these hills
at an early period of your attack, it will greatly facilitate the
capture and retention of Hill 305. It would also appear almost certain
that until these hills are in your possession it will be impossible to
land either troops or stores in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay by day.

5. The troops at your disposal will be:--

11th Division (less one Brigade R.F.A., at Helles).

10th Division (less 29th Infantry Brigade).

Three squadrons R.N. Armoured Car Division, R.N.A.S. (one squadron motor
cycles, six machine guns; one squadron Ford cars, six machine guns; one
squadron armoured cars, six machine guns).

Two Highland Mountain Artillery batteries.

An endeavour will be made to release for your force one or more 5-in.
howitzer batteries, now at Anzac, during the day following your initial
disembarkation.

6. In order that you may be able to arrange for the disembarkation of
your force to agree, so far as Naval exigencies will admit, with the
plan of operations on which you decide, the allocation of troops to the
ships and boats to be provided by the Navy is left to your decision.

With this object, tables have been drawn up, and are enclosed with these
instructions, showing the craft which can be placed at your disposal by