iating to Austria's pride. In a treaty concluded at Fontainebleau
on October tenth, 1807, with reference to the Italian frontier, her
dominions were shorn to the quick. At Napoleon's suggestion, Count
Starhemberg, her ambassador in London, intimated that England, in the
interest of peace, ought to restore the Danish fleet and make terms
with France. On the prompt refusal of Great Britain to listen, the
envoy withdrew from London; but he did not leave the English cabinet
in doubt as to the cause. He knew and broadly hinted that though his
master dared not trifle with a Franco-Russian alliance, his heart was
with the English cause. To all outward appearance, therefore, Austria
was quite as subservient as Prussia to the mighty coalition of
France and Russia.

Almost immediately after the rupture with England, Alexander had the
mortification of seeing his worst fears realized. Napoleon had opened
to him at Tilsit a dazzling vista of territorial aggrandizement.
Slowly but surely the desired effect was produced. Aware of all the
dangers he ran, the Czar nevertheless sacrificed every other
consideration, even that of his people's material comfort, in order to
demonstrate his good faith. By declaring war he likewise paid in
advance. But at the earliest possible moment, on November seventh, his
ambassador to France, sent for the purpose, demanded the return--to
wit, the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Simultaneously
and in another quarter this same demand was made emphatic. Immediately
after the meeting at Tilsit, Guilleminot, a French general, had been
sent as mediator between Russia and Turkey to the seat of war on the
Danube. An armistice was concluded under his direction at Slobozia, in
which were two or three compensatory clauses promising that Russia
would make restitution to Turkey of certain vessels and munitions of
war which had been captured. The Czar professed to take great umbrage
at these stipulations. Shortly afterward he rejected the whole paper,
and the Russian troops remained in Wallachia. This conduct was
intended to indicate his obstinate determination to have the vague
promises of Napoleon defined, and then to secure their performance.

The Emperor of the French had been kept well informed by Savary, and
knew that the Tilsit alliance, being distasteful to the Russian
people, hung on the personal good will of their sovereign. He would
have been glad to put Alexander off with some slight rectific