us.

The measures adopted to secure a period of comfort and repose for the
army were, unlike those taken for the campaign, apparently adequate.
The Emperor proceeded at once to station the various corps along the
Vistula, with provision and munition depots behind them. The
commissary department was thoroughly overhauled and much improved. The
line ran from Warsaw northwestward through Poland into Prussia, to the
river's mouth near Dantzic. Bernadotte had eighteen thousand men; Ney,
sixteen thousand; Soult, twenty-eight thousand; Augereau, eleven
thousand; Davout, twenty thousand; Lannes, eighteen thousand; Murat,
fourteen thousand; and the guard numbered fifteen thousand--a total of
about a hundred and forty thousand men. As conscripts and troops from
various garrisons came in, a new corps of twenty-three thousand men
was formed, and placed under the command of Lefebvre. At the same
time, from his headquarters at Warsaw, the Emperor proceeded with the
organization of a government for Poland, and with the training of her
national guard. The two Russian columns had withdrawn to Szuczyn,
where they united under the command of Bennigsen, and the Prussians
were at Angerburg under Lestocq. This left open the way to Koenigsberg,
and early in January, 1807, Ney, overpowered by the temptation to
relieve the miseries of his men, and to make a stroke on his own
account by seizing the capital of East Prussia, set out from
Neidenburg without orders, leaving Bernadotte's position at Elbing
much exposed. Lestocq, however, managed to block Ney's path until the
Russians under Bennigsen arrived and compelled the French general to
return with his men to their quarters. Napoleon administered a severe
reprimand; and well he might, for the advantage thus offered to the
Russians had tempted Bennigsen to move, and the Russian army, once
afoot, seemed determined to remain so. In this way were destroyed
Napoleon's excellent calculations for the season of absolutely
essential repose.

The action of Pultusk had made clear two serious defects in the
efficiency of Russia's force. During the battle, Kamenski, the
general-in-chief, a martinet and disciple of routine, had twice given
the order for retreat, and it was Bennigsen's disobedience which made
the conflict so indecisive that Russia claimed it as a victory. If a
victory, it was a barren one, because a weak and venal administration
of the commissary department had deprived the soldiers of sust