I as he did at the
persons of other enemies. In what was almost a personal correspondence
at an earlier time the Czar had exhibited his noblest qualities and an
enlightened liberalism. To be sure, every humiliation had been heaped on
Russia in spurning the Oubril treaty of the previous year and by the
light disdain of peace obligations solemnly taken. Yet Napoleon was
alive to the present and imperative need of a strong ally if his
mercantile attack on England were to have even a chance of success. With
Austria he had employed all the diplomatic arts of Talleyrand and
Andreossy to no avail: the Polish campaign had made Francis alert, that
of Russia was reviving the bellicose spirit of the Austrian army.
Negotiation with Frederick William had failed because based on the
concept of a new Prussia eastward of the Elbe, a menace alike to Russia
and Austria, and a confession of defeat by the King, who preferred to
place his trust in Alexander. Francis was equally adverse to
Talleyrand's elaborate scheme of a realm eastern in fact as in name,
stretching away down the Danube valley to the Euxine, a buffer against
Russian aggression, a menace or a support to Turkey as occasion
required. It was therefore a categorical imperative which determined the
Emperor of the French to woo the Emperor of all the Russias at this
juncture. When a proposition for an armistice was made by Bennigsen on
June twenty-first, it was not only courteously but impressively
accepted, and within a very short time things were moving as if the two
emperors were no longer enemies, but rather as if they were already
intimate friends, anxious to embrace. At least, even before their
meeting, such was the attitude they assumed in their communications with
each other and ostentatiously displayed to those about them. Some things
are perfectly patent in the Czar's desire for peace. Russian autocracy
as a system was still unshakable, but the authority of his house was
not: in sixty years there had been no fewer than four revolutionary
upheavals, either by the soldiery or by a palace cabal. The instability
of the throne had sadly diminished the prestige of the country, and
after Austerlitz the nation had been treated with contempt in the person
of the Czar, both in his political and his military character, the rest
of Europe being profoundly indifferent to Russian chagrin. His situation
was not improved by Pultusk, Eylau, or Friedland. Dissensions in the
field were no