uld not restore the real Poland, but it would create a
Poland, and give him a Polish army. It was already decided that the
Elbe should form Frederick William's western frontier; to weaken his
strength still further would destroy all balance between Prussia and
Austria. Moreover, Alexander made a tender appeal, and adroitly
suggested a distasteful counter-proposition. Accordingly it was
settled that the great province should remain Prussian. This was a
large concession to the Czar.
To make some pretense of fulfilling the lavish but indefinite promises
made to the Poles, the lands of Warsaw and the province of Posen, with
a considerable tract not now contained in it, were erected into the
grand duchy of Warsaw. Under the influence of historical reminiscence
this was given, not as a province but as a separate sovereignty to the
Elector of Saxony, who was simultaneously made king and a member of
the Rhine Confederation. The Czar, in return for his cessions to the
grand duchy of Warsaw, received the Prussian district of Bielostok. As
a compensation for the Bocche di Cattaro and the Ionian Islands,
Dantzic was restored to its position of a free city. The Prussian
lands of the Elbe, together with Hesse-Cassel and many minor domains,
were erected into the kingdom of Westphalia for the Emperor's brother
Jerome. We have almost forgotten in our day how, less than a century
ago, Germany was divided into insignificant fragments. It is
instructive to recall that the formation of this new kingdom
beneficently ended the separate existence of no fewer than twenty-four
more or less autonomous powers--electorates, duchies, counties,
bishoprics, and cities. It contained the all-important fortress of
Magdeburg, the possession of whose frowning walls carried with it the
command of the Elbe, and virtually made Prussia a conquered and
tributary state.
This seemed to Frederick William the climax of his misfortunes. He had
daily information from the Czar of what was under consideration, and
the rescue of Silesia by his mediator gave him high hopes for the
preservation of Magdeburg. But his poor-spirited behavior wearied even
Alexander, who, willing at the outset to atone for desertion by
intervention, became toward the end very cold. When the King desired
permission to plead in person for Magdeburg, Napoleon refused. The
Prussian case might be presented by counsel. Goltz was speedily
summoned to the task, but though he was always about to ha
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