ont pressed forward close
to the Russian ranks with all Victor's artillery,--thirty-six
pieces,--and began to pour in a deadly fire. This routed the enemy,
who fled through the town and over the stream; but their right wing,
being thus turned into the rear-guard, was caught by Lannes before it
reached the crossing, and checked. The wooden bridge was set in
flames, and before nightfall that portion of the Russian army which
had not yet crossed was virtually annihilated.

About eighty thousand French and about fifty-five thousand Russians
took part in this battle; the former lost seven thousand men, the
latter sixteen thousand, with eighty field-pieces. It was the only one
of Napoleon's great engagements in which he admitted his numerical
superiority to his enemy. The same day Soult and Davout, with Murat's
cavalry, drove Lestocq into Koenigsberg, and prepared to invest the
town. But Lestocq's troops, with the garrison and the court, escaped,
flying for refuge toward the Russian frontier. Bennigsen collected at
Allenburg the troops he had saved, and, retreating in good order,
crossed the Niemen at Tilsit four days later. He then had the option
of awaiting Napoleon, who was close behind, or of making peace, or of
withdrawing into the interior beyond the enemy's reach, as Alexander
had done after Austerlitz. As a matter of fact, he confessed utter
defeat. "This is no longer a fight, it is butchery," he wrote to the
Czar's brother, the Grand Duke Constantine. "Tell the Emperor what you
will," he said again, "if only I can stop the carnage."[5]

[Footnote 5: Oudinot: Memoires, Ch. II.]

The campaign of Friedland shows either less genius or more than any
other of Napoleon's victories, according to the standpoint from which
it is judged. If he is to be regarded throughout its duration merely
as a general, then his conduct shows comparatively little ability. He
came on his enemy where he did not expect a battle. Although he had
ample time to evolve and execute an admirable plan, and while his loss
was trifling compared with that of his opponents, yet, nevertheless,
Friedland was a commonplace, incomplete affair. It compelled the foe
to abandon Heilsberg, but it did not annihilate him or necessarily end
the war. Bennigsen found all Russia behind him after his defeat:
twenty-five thousand men came in from Koenigsberg, Prince Labanoff
brought up the Russian reserves, and thus was formed a substantial
army. A retreat wit