offices in the service of
his country.

CHAPTER II

CHECK TO THE GRAND ARMY: EYLAU[2]

[Footnote 2: References more specifically valuable for this
and the next chapter are Haeusser, Czartoryski, Marbot,
Lejeune, Oudinot, Lettow-Vorbeck, Sir R. Wilson, with the
Castlereagh Letters and Napoleon's Correspondence.]

Napoleon's Preparations -- His Clever Strategy -- The Plan
Discovered by the Russians -- The Armies at Eylau -- Failure of
Napoleon's Tactics -- The Battle Indecisive -- The French Army
Demoralized -- Napoleon's Anxiety -- His Army in Winter Quarters
-- The Emperor's Activity -- Rearrangement of his Forces -- An
Envoy from the Shah of Persia -- Reinforcements from France and
Germany -- The Neutrality of Austria.

[Sidenote: 1807]

It was not a very rude shock to his sensuous ease, however, when on
January twenty-seventh, 1807, Napoleon received the news of
Bennigsen's march. In a general way he had been aware for some days
that the enemy was moving, but he believed they had no other intention
than to derive what immediate advantage could be had from Ney's
rashness. In the absence of fuller information he had not changed his
opinion, but the army was nevertheless put in readiness, the trains
were equipped, and orders were issued for abandoning temporarily the
siege of Dantzic and for the complete occupation of Thorn. This step
was taken, as a glance at the map will show, to insure a new line of
connection with Posen and Berlin, directly in front of his base, in
case the oblique one he was holding between Warsaw and Bartenstein
should be endangered by a flank movement of the Russians.

Believing that Bennigsen's plan was to reach Elbing and defend his
communications with Dantzic, Napoleon issued orders on January
twenty-seventh for a countermarch in that direction, to engage him
either there or farther to the eastward. The orders given next day to
Davout and Augereau show that by swift movements he hoped to attack at
Willenberg, break through Bennigsen's center, and scatter his forces
right and left. Lannes had been taken ill after Pultusk, and was still
an invalid; Savary was therefore put in command of his well-tried
corps to bear the brunt of the battle. His business was to cover the
line of the Narew for the purpose of assuring freedom of action to the
main French army, and with that end in view to attack the Russian
corps