slam and
its doctrines which have devastated the western portion of Asia and
brought about the present sad state of things; but it is the tyranny of
the Moslem princes, who have wilfully perverted the doctrines of the
Prophet, and sought and found maxims in the Koran as a basis for their
despotic rule. They have not allowed the faintest suspicion of doubt in
matters of religion, and, efficaciously distorting and crushing all
liberal principles, they have prevented the dawn of a Moslem
Renaissance."[114]

In the opening chapter we saw how Oriental despotism reached its evil
maximum in the eighteenth century, and how the Mohammedan Revival was
not merely a puritan reformation of religion, but was also in part a
political protest against the vicious and contemptible tyrants who
misruled the Moslem world. This internal movement of political
liberalism was soon cross-cut by another political current coming in
from the West. Comparing the miserable decrepitude of the Moslem East
with Europe's prosperity and vigour, thinking Moslems were beginning to
recognize their shortcomings, and they could not avoid the conclusion
that their woes were in large part due to their wretched governments.
Indeed, a few even of the Moslem princes came to realize that there must
be some adoption of Western political methods if their countries were to
be saved from destruction. The most notable examples of this new type of
Oriental sovereign were Sultan Mahmud II of Turkey and Mehemet Ali of
Egypt, both of whom came to power about the beginning of the nineteenth
century.

Of course none of these reforming princes had the slightest idea of
granting their subjects constitutional liberties or of transforming
themselves into limited monarchs. They intended to remain absolute, but
absolute more in the sense of the "enlightened autocrat" of Europe and
less in the sense of the purely Oriental despot. What they wanted were
true organs of government--army, civil service, judiciary, etc.--which
would function efficiently and semi-automatically as governmental
machinery, and not as mere amorphous masses of individuals who had to be
continuously prodded and punished by the sovereign in order to get
anything done.

Mahmud II, Mehemet Ali, and their princely colleagues persisted in their
new policies, but the outcome of these "reforms from above" was, on the
whole, disappointing. The monarchs might build barracks and bureaux on
European models and fill them