t, have to bow our heads before
miserable Pashas, most of them former Christian slaves come to power by
the most shameful courses."[141] Throughout the nineteenth century every
Turkish defeat in Europe was followed by a seditious outburst in its
Arab provinces.

Down to the middle of the nineteenth century these seditious stirrings
remained sporadic, unco-ordinated outbursts of religious, regional, or
tribal feeling, with no genuinely "Nationalistic" programme of action or
ideal. But in the later sixties a real nationalist agitation appeared.
Its birthplace was Syria. That was what might have been expected, since
Syria was the part of Turkey's Arab dominions most open to Western
influences. This first Arab nationalist movement, however, did not
amount to much. Directed by a small group of noisy agitators devoid of
real ability, the Turkish Government suppressed it without much
difficulty.

The disastrous Russian war of 1877, however, blew the scattered embers
into a fresh flame. For several years Turkey's Arab provinces were in
full ferment. The nationalists spoke openly of throwing off the Turkish
yoke and welding the Arab lands into a loose-knit confederation headed
by a religious potentate, probably the Shereef of Mecca. This was
obviously an adaptation of Western nationalism to the traditional Arab
ideal of a theocratic democracy already realized in the Meccan caliphate
and the Wahabi government of the Nejd.

This second stirring of Arab nationalism was likewise of short duration.
Turkey was now ruled by Sultan Abdul Hamid, and Abdul Hamid's
Pan-Islamic policy looked toward good relations with his Arab subjects.
Accordingly, Arabs were welcomed at Constantinople, favours were heaped
upon Arab chiefs and notables, while efforts were made to promote the
contentment of the empire's Arab populations. At the same time the
construction of strategic railways in Syria and the Hedjaz gave the
Turkish Government a stronger grip over its Arab provinces than ever
before, and conversely rendered successful Arab revolts a far more
remote possibility. Furthermore, Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda
was specially directed toward awakening a sense of Moslem solidarity
between Arabs and Turks as against the Christian West. These efforts
achieved a measure of success. Certainly, every European aggression in
the Near East was an object-lesson to Turks and Arabs to forget, or at
least adjourn, their domestic quarrels in face of the