state_, etc. In fact, every word stands under as many
distinct genera, at least, as there are simple or indefinable qualities
to be enumerated in its definition.

Sec. 3. Partially similar to a scientific nomenclature, ordinary language
has likewise a terminology for describing things according to their
qualities and structure. Such is the function of all the names of
colours, sounds, tastes, contrasts of temperature, of hardness, of
pleasantness; in short, of all descriptive adjectives, and all names for
the parts and processes of things. Any word connoting a quality may be
used to describe many very different things, as long as they agree in
that quality.

But the quality connoted by a word, and treated as always the same
quality, is often only analogically the same. We speak of a _great_
storm, a _great_ man, a _great_ book; but _great_ is in each case not
only relative, implying small, and leaving open the possibility that
what we call great is still smaller than something else of its kind, but
it is also predicated with reference to some quality or qualities, which
may be very different in the several cases of its application. If the
book is prized for wisdom, or for imagination, its greatness lies in
that quality; if the man is distinguished for influence, or for courage,
his greatness is of that nature; if the storm is remarkable for
violence, or for duration, its greatness depends on that fact. The word
_great_, therefore, is not used for these things in the same sense, but
only analogically and elliptically. Similarly with good, pure, free,
strong, rich, and so on. 'Rest' has not the same meaning in respect of
a stone and of an animal, nor 'strong' in respect of thought and muscle,
nor 'sweet' in respect of sugar and music. But here we come to the
border between literal and figurative use; every one sees that
figurative epithets are analogical; but by custom any figurative use may
become literal.

Again, many general names of widely different meaning, are brought
together in describing any concrete object, as an animal, or a
landscape, or in defining any specific term. This is the sense of the
doctrine, that any concrete thing is a conflux of generalities or
universals: it may at least be considered in this way; though it seems
more natural to say, that an object presents these different aspects to
a spectator, who, fully to comprehend it, must classify it in every
aspect.

Sec. 4. The process of seeking a