lief which we had promised, with expedition
sufficient to procure any advantages to our ally, to preserve her
provinces from being laid waste, her towns from being stormed, and her
armies from being ruined; to repress the confidence of the French, and
recall them from conquests to the defence of their own territories, it
was apparently necessary to hire foreign troops; for to have sent over
all our own forces, had been to have tempted the French to change
their design of invading the Austrian dominions, into that of
attacking Britain, and attempting to add this kingdom to their other
conquests; to have raised new troops with expedition equal to the
necessity that demanded them, was either absolutely impossible, or at
least, very difficult; and when raised, they would have been only new
troops, who, whatever might be their courage, would have been without
skill in war, and would, therefore, have been distrusted by those whom
they assisted, and despised by those whom they opposed.

Nothing, therefore, remained, but that auxiliaries should be tried,
and the only question then to be decided, was, what nation should be
solicited to supply us? Nor was this so difficult to be answered as in
former times, since there was not the usual liberty of choice; many of
the princes who send their troops to fight for other powers, were at
that time either influenced by the promises, or bribed by the money,
or intimidated by the forces of France; some of them were engaged in
schemes for enlarging their own dominions, and therefore were
unwilling to supply others with those troops for which they were
themselves projecting employment; and, perhaps, of some others it
might reasonably be doubted, whether they would not betray the cause
which they should be retained to support, and whether they would not
in secret wish the depression of the queen of Hungary, by means of
those invaders whom they promised to resist.

Sir, amidst all these considerations, which there was not time
completely to adjust, it was necessary to turn their eyes upon some
power to which none of these objections could be made; and, therefore,
they immediately fixed upon the electorate of Hanover, as subject to
the same monarch, and of which, therefore, the troops might be
properly considered as our national allies, whose interest and
inclinations must be the same with our own, and whose fidelity might
be warranted by our own sovereign.

It was no small advantage that th