od, and which
we may, therefore, now retract. He concludes, that the concession
which might then escape us ought not to have been snatched by our
ministers, and made the foundation of their conduct, because they knew
it was made upon false suppositions, and in prospect of a recompense
that never would be granted.

I hope there is no necessity for declaring, that this reasoning cannot
safely be admitted, since, if the vote of the senate be not a
sufficient warrant for any measure, no man can undertake the
administration of our affairs, and that government which no man will
venture to serve must be quickly at an end.

For my part, I know not how the nation or the senate has been
disappointed of any just expectations, nor can I conceive that any
such disappointments vacate their votes or annul their resolutions,
and therefore I cannot but think the ministry sufficiently justified,
if they can show that they have not deviated from them.

Lord QUARENDON spoke next to the effect following:--Sir, I am so far
from thinking that the past conduct or the present proposals of the
ministry deserve approbation, that, in my opinion, all the arguments
which have been produced in their favour are apparently fallacious,
and even the positions on which they are founded, and which are laid
down as uncontrovertible, are generally false.

It is first asserted, that we are indispensably obliged to assist the
queen of Hungary against France, and to support her in the possession
of the hereditary dominions of the Austrian house, and from thence is
precipitately inferred the necessity of assembling armies, and hiring
mercenaries, of exhausting our treasure, and heaping new burdens upon
the publick.

That we concurred with other powers in promising to support the
Pragmatick sanction is not to be denied, nor do I intend to insinuate,
that the faith of treaties ought not strictly to be kept; but we are
not obliged to perform more than we promised, or take upon ourselves
the burden which was to be supported by the united strength of many
potentates, and of which we only engaged to bear a certain part. We
ought, undoubtedly, to furnish the troops which we promised, and ought
to have sent them when they were first demanded; but there is no
necessity that we should supply the deficiencies of every other power,
and that we should determine to stand alone in defence of the
Pragmatick sanction; that we should, by romantick generosity,
impoverish ou