an
island intrenched within its own natural boundaries, it may stand
secure and unconcerned in all the storms of the rest of the world.
This doctrine, inconsistent as it is with all sense and reason,
contrary as it is to the universal principles of policy by which this
nation hath been governed from the conquest to this hour, is yet
openly professed and avowed by many without these walls; and though no
man has yet ventured to own this opinion publickly and directly in
this house, yet some gentlemen even here, in effect maintain it, when
they argue, that in no case this nation ought to assist or support the
balance of power without the concurrence of the Dutch. This tends
inevitably to produce the same fatal effect; it reduces this country
to depend upon Holland, to be a province to Holland; and France would
then have no more to do to become mistress of all Europe, than to gain
over one single town of the United Provinces, or to corrupt a few
members of the States; it is, therefore, a doctrine of the greatest
danger. The only solid maxim is, that whoever becomes master of the
continent, must in the end obtain the dominion of the sea. To confirm
this, I may venture to cite an old example, nor can I be accused of
pedantry in doing of it, since it is an instance drawn from the last
universal monarchy to which the world submitted. The Romans had no
sooner divided, broken and subdued those powers upon the continent of
Europe, who had given a diversion in the great attempt they had long
intended, than they attacked the Carthaginians, a maritime power,
potent in arms, immensely opulent, possessed of the trade of the whole
world, and unrivalled mistress of the sea. Yet these people, who
enjoyed no wealth, pursued no commerce, and at the commencement of
their quarrel were not masters of a single ship, at length prevailed
against this enemy upon their proper element, beat and destroyed their
fleets, invaded their dominions, and subdued their empire. From
whence, sir, I must conclude, that we cannot wholly rely upon our
situation, or depend solely on our naval power; and I may venture to
reason upon this axiom, _that this nation must contribute to support
the house of Austria and the balance of power in some degree_.

The next question that occurs, is, in what degree we ought to do it,
and whether we should do it with our whole force? Taking, therefore,
our footing here upon this axiom, that we must contribute to it in
some degree