wer; _particular_, to prevent
the French from making any farther acquisitions on this side of
Flanders. The first might possibly be answered in a good degree, by
giving that princess an equivalent in money; but the second cannot be
securely provided against, without an army on this side of Europe in
the British pay. Sir, is it not natural for every one of us to guard
our vital parts, rather than our more remote members? Would not the
queen of Hungary (stipulate and condition with her as you please)
apply the greatest part of these subsidies in defence of her dominions
in the heart of Germany? Might it not even induce her to enlarge her
views, and to think of conquests and equivalents for what she has
already lost, which it might be vain and ruinous for us to support her
in? Would she not leave Flanders to shift for itself, or still to be
taken care of by the Dutch and Britain? In such a case, if France
should find it no longer possible to make any impression on her
territories on the German side, what must we expect to be the
consequence? I think it very visible she would on a sudden quit her
expensive and destructive projects on that quarter, and there only
carry on a defensive war, while she fell with the greater part of her
force at once upon the Low Countries, which would by this measure be
wholly unprovided; and she might there acquire in one campaign, before
any possibility of making head against her, (which the Dutch would
hardly attempt, and could certainly not alone be able to effect,) all
that she has been endeavouring for the last century to obtain, and
what no union of powers could be ever capable of regaining from her.
All this will be effectually prevented by an army paid by us on this
side of Europe; an army ready to march to the borders of her country,
and to intercept her succours and supplies for the German war; an
army, ready to protect the petty states, whose interest and
inclination it apparently must be to declare for us, and to join their
forces with us, when they no longer fear the power of France; an army,
which may possibly give courage and spirit to greater powers, who may
still doubt, without these vigorous measures, (after what they have
formerly experienced,) whether they could even yet depend upon us; an
army, (if the posture of affairs should make it necessary,) able to
cause a powerful diversion to the French forces, by an attack upon
Lorrain and Champagne, and still within distance to re