tranquillity he may now seem to look upon this general
commotion, his conduct gives us no reason to imagine, that he has
changed his maxims, that he is now forgetful or negligent of his own
interest, or that he will not snatch the first opportunity of
aggrandizing himself by new pretensions to the queen of Hungary's
dominions.
At least, my lords, it may without scruple be asserted, that the hopes
which some either form or affect of engaging him in a confederacy for
the support of the Pragmatick sanction, are merely chimerical. He who
has hitherto considered no interest but his own, he who has perhaps
endangered himself by attempting to weaken the only power to which he,
as well as the other princes of the empire, can have recourse for
protection from the ambition of France, and has, therefore, broken the
rules of policy only to gratify a favourite passion, will scarcely
concur in the exaltation of that family which he has so lately
endeavoured to depress, and which he has so much exasperated against
him. If he is at length, my lords, alarmed at the ambition of the
house of Bourbon, and has learned not to facilitate those designs
which are in reality formed against himself, it cannot be doubted,
that he looks with equal fear on the house of Austria, that he knows
his safety to consist only in the weakness of both, and that in any
contest between them, the utmost that can be hoped from him is
neutrality.
But, my lords, he whose security depends only on a supposition that
men will not deviate from right reason or true policy, is in a state
which can afford him very little tranquillity or confidence: whatever
is necessarily to be preserved, ought to be defended, not only from
certain and constant danger, but from casual and possible injuries;
and amongst the rest, from those which may proceed from the mutability
of will, or the depravation of understanding; nor shall we
sufficiently establish the house of Austria, if we leave it liable to
be shaken whenever the king of Prussia shall feel his ambition
rekindled, or his malevolence excited; we must not leave it dependant
on the friendship or policy of the neighbouring powers, but must
enable it once more to awe the empire, and set at defiance the malice
of its enemies.
This, my lords, might have been done by a liberal subsidy, by which
armies might have been levied, garrisons established, and cities
fortified; and why any other method was pursued, what reason can be
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