s programme has been the consistent manner
in which she has tried to separate her European neighbours from Britain
in order to deal with them separately or alone. That her endeavours
ended in failure is due to the instinct of self-preservation which has
drawn Germany's opponents closer together, in exact proportion to the
increasing force of her efforts. Both in peace and war, Germany desired
and endeavoured to switch off Britain's influence in Europe.

The diplomatic battles of 1905, 1908 and 1911 were a few of the efforts
to dislodge Great Britain from her _ententes_, while her repeated
attempts to buy this country's neutrality, down to the eve of war, are
proof that Germany wanted a free hand in Europe.[192] If she had
succeeded in her purpose, it is exceedingly doubtful whether any Power
could have prevented her from exercising a free hand in the whole world.

[Footnote 192: Professor Schiemann: "Wie England eine Verstaendigung mit
Deutschland verhinderte" ("How England prevented an Understanding with
Germany"). Berlin, 1915; pp. 20-21: "From the very commencement Berlin
was convinced that the probability of a combined Franco-Russian attack
was exceedingly small, if England's entrance to this Germanophobe
combination could be prevented. Therefore we endeavoured to secure
England's neutrality in case of war (1909), that is, if an Anglo-German
alliance could not be achieved--an alliance which would have guaranteed
the world's peace." (Schiemann's insinuation that Germany desired an
alliance is an instance of _suggestio falsi_. Germany had decided in
1902 never to conclude an alliance with this country.--Author.)]

Coming down to the last trial of diplomatic power, we are confronted by
the immovable fact, that it too was a challenge on the part of the
Central Empires. The conditions seemed peculiarly favourable to them,
for the British Ambassador declared to the Russian Government on July
24th, 1914, that Britain would never draw the sword on a purely Serbian
question. Moreover, in the preceding year, a British minister, says
Professor Schiemann, had given what we may style a remarkable
semi-official promise that Great Britain would never go to war with
Germany.

"On February 18th, 1913, Mr. Charles Trevelyan, M.P., paid me a visit,
and assured me with the greatest certainty that England would under no
circumstances wage war on Germany. A ministry which made preparations
for war, would be immediately overthrown."[19